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COMMENT
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BANKRUPTCY COURTS
UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978
[Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982)]
The UnitedStates Supreme Court decision that the jurisdictiongrantedbankruptcy
courts by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 impermissbly infringedon Article
III power of thejudiciary not only left bankrupts and those who dealt with bankrupts ina quandg, but shook accepted perceptions about the authority of legisla-

tive, administrative, and adunctive courts. This Comment dissects the
Marathon decision and identifies the unanswered questions it poses.
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INTRODUCTION

When Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 it vested
broad powers 2 in newly created bankruptcy judges, 3 but failed to pro1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (hereinafter
cited as the Reform Act).
2. See Reform Act § 241(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982), § 250 (1), 28 U.S.C. § 2256
(1982), § 101, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982).
3. Reform Act § 201(1), 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
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vide the bankruptcy judges with the protections of life tenure4 and a
guaranteed salary. 5 In Northern Pikehe Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co.,6 the United States Supreme Court struck down the Reform
Act's broad grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges as a violation of
Article III of the Constitution. 7 The Marathon opinion sheds new light
and raises new and complex questions regarding the issues of federalism 8
and separation of powers. 9
On October 1, 1978,10 the Reform Act replaced the Bankruptcy Act of
1898.11 The purpose of the Reform Act was to modernize the bankruptcy laws.I2 In contrast to the 1898 Act, 13 the Reform Act eliminated
4. Reform Act, § 201(a), 28 U.S.C. § 153 (1982).
5. Reform Act, § 201(a), 28 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
6. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
7. Id at 87.
8. The principle of federalism requires that the federal government avoid undue
interference with the states. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)
(struck down 1974 amendments to Fair Labor Standards Act extending minimum wage
and hour requirements to states and their political subdivisions); Fry v. United States , 421
U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) ("Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the
states' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system").
9. The concept of separation of powers involves the division of functions among the
executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the federal government. See J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 126-127 (1978);see also

L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 2-3 (1978) ("The Link Between Separa-

tion-of-Power Considerations and Controversies Over Federal-State Division").
10. Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (Act of Repeal).
The Reform Act provided for a transition period before the new provisions were to take
full effect on April 1, 1984. Reform Act § 402(b), 92 Stat. at 2682. During the transition.
period, previously existing bankruptcy courts were to continue in existence. Reform Act
§ 4 04(a), 92 Stat. at 2683. Incumbent bankruptcy referees were designated to serve as
bankruptcy judges until March 31, 1984, or until their successors took office. Reform Act
§ 404(a), 92 Stat. at 2683. During the transition period, bankruptcy courts, as defined in
Reform Act § 404(a) 92 Stat. at 2682, were empowered to exercise all the jurisdiction
conferred by § 1471 on the district courts, although that provision was not to become
formally effective until 1984. Reform Act § 405, 92 Stat. at 2685. The procedure for
taking appeals from the decisions of bankruptcy judges during the transition period was
essentially the same as the procedure that would have taken effect in 1984. Reform Act
§ 4 05(c), 92 Stat. at 2685; see in/ta note 126.
11. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [hereinafter cited as the 1898 Act]. The
last comprehensive reform of the federal bankruptcy system prior to the Reform Act was
the Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
12. S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprntedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5787; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprthtedih 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963.
13. Under the 1898 Act, federal district courts served as bankruptcy courts. See 11
U.S.C. 1(10) (1976). Proceedings in bankruptcy cases generally were held before bankruptcy referees, appointed by the district court, unless the district court elected to withdraw the case from the referee. 11 U.S.C. app. Bankr. R. 102 (1976). The judgment of
the referee could be appealed to the district court within ten days. 11 U.S.C. app. Bankr.
R. 801-803 (1976). Under the 1898 Act, bankruptcy courts were vested with summary
jurisdiction, which extended to controversies involving property in the actual and con-
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the referee system and created bankruptcy courts as separate courts of
record and as "adjuncts"'4 to the district courts of the United States.15
The Reform Act provided that bankruptcy judges be appointed by the
president, with advice and consent of the Senate, for fourteen year
terms 16 and be subject to salary diminution' 7 under the Federal Salary
Act.' 8 The Reform Act granted jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters to
the United States district courts and then assigned such jurisdiction exclusively to the bankruptcy courts. 19 The Reform Act granted bankruptcy courts much greater jurisdiction than that exercised by referees
under the 1898 Act. 20 Finally, the Reform Act granted to bankruptcy
courts all the power of courts of equity, law, and admirality, 21 including
the power to try jury cases 22 and to issue Writs of Habeas Corpus, 23 constructive

possession of the court, such as property in possession of the bankrupt at the time
of the proceedings. The bankruptcy courts did not have plenary jurisdiction, however,
over disputes involving property in possession of a third person, except by consent. See
generally H.R. Doc. No. 93-137 (Pt. I), 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (report of congressionally created Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, created in 1970 to
study and recommend changes in federal bankruptcy law); 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,(MB)
38.09 [2], at 1435 (14th ed. 1978).
14. As referred to in this Comment, an adjunct is a hearing officer acting as an assistant to the federal district court. See, e.g., Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93
Stat. 643 (1979) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631, 633, 636; 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (Supp. 1980));
FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (1982) (regarding appointments and powers of special masters). In
certain cases administrative agencies may function as adjuncts. See tna notes 130-35 and
accompanying text (discussion of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)).
15. Reform Act, § 201(a), 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
16. Reform Act, § 201(a), 28 U.S.C. §§ 152-53 (1982). Compare § 201(a) with II
U.S.C. § 62 (1976)(repealed) (six year term held by bankruptcy referees).
17. Reform Act, § 201(a), 28 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
18. 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-361 (1982).
19. Reform Act, § 241(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982); see also S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. at 154, reprnted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5940 ("Except for municipal adjustments and railroad reorganization cases, the district judge will be
expected to act in Title I cases only in limited instances (1) where it is necessary to enjoin
a state or federal court or (2) to punish a person for contempt by imprisonment or by fine
of more than $1,000. Otherwise, the district judge will function only as an appellate judge
in bankruptcy matters as provided in subsection (e) of this section.")
20. Reform Act, § 241(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982) ("jurisdiction of all civil proceedings . . . arising in or related to cases under Title 11."). Under § 1471, the expanded
jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts included elimination of the distinction between summary and plenary jurisdictions. See supra note 13; see also S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. at 153, reprited in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5939.
Actions that formerly had to be tried in the state court or the federal district
court, at great cost and delay to the estate, may now be tried in the bankruptcy
court. The idea of possession and consent as basis for jurisdiction is eliminated.
The adjunct bankruptcy courts will exercise in personam jurisdiction as well as
in rem jurisdiction in order that they may handle everything that arises in a
bankruptcy case.
Id
21. Reform Act, § 241(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982).
22. Reform Act, § 241(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1480 (1982).
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tempt citations in certain situations, 24 and all process, orders, and judg2
ments necessary to carry out the provisions of the Reform Act. 5
Article III, Section 1, of the Federal Constitution provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
26
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

The establishment by Congress of bankruptcy courts with wide-ranging
powers, but without the protections of Article III courts, raised the question of the constitutionality of the new bankruptcy courts under the Reform Act.

27

On March 8, 1979, Northern Pipeline Construction Company instituted a lawsuit against Marathon Pipe Line Company for claims arising
out of a contract between the parties. 28 On January 14, 1980, Northern
23. Reform Act, § 250(a), 28 U.S.C. § 2256 (1982).
24. Reform Act, § 241(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982).

25. Reform Act, § 101(a), 11 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1982).
26. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
27. See, e.g., Krattenmaker, Article III andJudicialIndependence. Why the New Bankruptcy
Courts are Unconstitutional,70 GEO. L. J. 297 (1981); Note, Article III Limits on Article I Courts.The Constitutionahty of the Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 MagistrateAct, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
560 (1980).
The legislative history of the Reform Act also indicates that the constitutionality of
the exercise of broad judicial powers by judges lacking Article III guarantees of life tenure
and undiminished salary was questioned during hearings on proposed bankruptcy legislation. Heartngs on HR. 31 and HR. 32 before the Subcommittee on Civiland ConstitutionalRights of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2081-84 (1977) (testimony of William T. Plumb). The Subcommittee on Civil Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, concluded that "the text of the Constitution and the case law
indicate that . . . Congress should establish the proposed bankruptcy court under Article
III, with all the protection that the Framers intended for an independent judiciary." SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL BANKRUPTCY COURTS

33 (Comm. Print 3, 1977). The Department of Justice sent a letter and memorandum to
the chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, stating that although the Department opposed the creation of independent Article III bankruptcy courts, it had concluded
that "the proposed bankruptcy courts cannot be created as Article I courts," Letter with
Appendix from Patricia M. Wald, Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs to
House Comm. on the Judiciary (July 14, 1977). The House subsequently passed a bill
containing Article III safeguards, H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 1783804 (1978), but the Senate passed its own bankruptcy bill, S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
124 CONG. REC. 28284, (1978), which eliminated the life tenure and guaranteed salary
protections of the House bill. The Senate bill adopted the concept of an independent
bankruptcy court as an adjunct to an Article III court. The adjunct concept was incorporated into the final bill as a result of last minute negotiations between managers of the bills
in both houses. See 124 CONG. REC. 32393 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Don Edwards); Klee,
Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 941, 950-51, (1979).
28. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., No. C-79-01100-L(B),
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filed a petition for reorganization 2 9 in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Minnesota.30 On March 25, 1980, Northern
commenced an adversary proceeding 3 t against Marathon in -which
Northern alleged the same contract claims it had asserted in the original
suit. 32 The claims Northern sought to enforce were all governed by state
law.

33

Marathon responded to this complaint by claiming that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction34 over the action for breach of contract
because it involved an exercise of "the judicial Power of the United
States" 35 which may be exercised only by tenured judges as provided by
(W.D. Ky. 1979). Northern sought to enforce claims for relief based on construction of
several miles of petroleum pipeline in and around Louisville, Kentucky. Northern and
Marathon entered a contract in October, 1977, under which Northern would construct
the pipeline under Marathon's supervision. Northern's complaint asserted its own full
performance, and alleged a variety of breaches by Marathon. Northern claimed damages
totaling $1,464,602.44. See Brief for Respondent at 5, Exhibit 1, at 7, Marathon Pipeline
Co. v. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 12 Bankr. 946 (D. Minn. 1981).
29. Northern filed a petition in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 301, (Supp. II
1978) 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-46 (Supp. 11 1978), and 11 U.S.C. app. Bankr. R. 11-3 (Supp. II
1978). A petition for reorganization, under chapter 11, allows a business debtor to file a
plan with the court to discharge his debts without liquidating his business. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-46 (Supp. 11 1978).
30. See Marathon Pipeline Co. v. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 12 Bankr. 946, 947
(D. Minn. 1981).
31. An adversary proceeding is a claim brought by a debtor or trustee in bankruptcy
against a non-party on behalf of the estate in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. app. Bankr. R.
Part VII (1982).
32. See Marathon Pipeline Co. v. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 12 Bankr. 946, 947
(D. Minn. 1981). Northern omitted a claim for relief based on an alleged mechanic's lien.
Id at 947 n.2.
33. See Brief of Appellees at 2, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) ("Northern sought to enforce claims for monies allegedly due
under written contracts and for changes and additional work on the pipeline and to recover damages for alleged breach of contract and warranty, misrepresentations and economic coercion and distress").
34. In addition to its constitutional claim, Marathon alleged that the Minnesota
court lacked in personam jurisdiction over it under the "minimum contacts" doctrine of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Marathon is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Findlay, Ohio. It does not do business
in Minnesota and is not amenable to suit in Minnesota state or federal district court. See
Brief of Appellees at 40, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50 (1982). Bankruptcy courts have held that they are not bound by the minimum
contacts doctrine. See, e.g., Nixon Mach. Co. v. Roy Energy, Inc. (In re Nixon Mach. Co.),
15 Bankr. 131 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981); Beasley v. Kelco Foods, Inc. (In re Trim-lean
Meat Prod., Inc.), 11 Bankr. 1010 (Bankr. D. Del. 1981); Whippany Paper Bd. Co. v.
Victory Container Corp. (In re Whippany Paper Bd. Co.), 15 Bankr. 312 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1981); Line By Dakota, Inc. v. Lebsack (In re The Line By Dakota, Inc.), 8 Bankr. 643
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1981); Scott v. Fort Ord Fed. Credit Union (In re G. Weeks Sec. Inc.), 5
Bankr. 220, 225 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980).
35. U.S. CONST.art. III, § 1.
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Article III of the Constitution.3 6 The United States District Court for
Minnesota held that "the delegation of authority in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 to
the bankruptcy judges to try cases which are otherwise relegated under
the Constitution to Article III judges . . . is an unconstitutional delegation of Article III judicial power to a nontenured Article I court."37
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the plurality held, in
a surprisingly broad opinion, that all jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
courts, as constituted under the Reform Act, is void as a violation of
Article 111.38 Although the Court could have narrowly struck down the

bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to determine the type of claims presented
in Marathon,39 the Court held that the entire grant of jurisdiction under
section 1471 is void. The Supreme Court applied its decision prospectively only, 4o and stayed the judgment to give Congress an opportunity
to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts without impairing the interim ad41
ministration of the bankruptcy laws.
36. Marathon, 12 Bankr. at 947 (Bankruptcy court denied Marathon's motion to dismiss. Marathon appealed to the United States District Court for Minnesota).
37. Id at 956.
38. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 87.
39. Cf 458 U.S. at 87-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justice O'Connor, disagreed with the plurality, regarding the scope of the issue presented
to the Court, stating that "this Court should decide no more of a constitutional question
than is absolutely necessary .... " Id at 90. The concurrence would hold unconstitutional only as much of the Reform Act as confers jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court to
hear and decide common law contract actions such as the Marathon case. Nevertheless,
because the concurring justices agreed with the plurality that the unconstitutional provisions of the Reform Act are not readily severable from the remaining grant of authority to
the bankruptcy courts, see id at 87 n.40, they agreed with the plurality's judgment that all
of§ 1471 is unconstitutional. Id. at 91.
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, insisted that the Court's holding is limited to the
proposition stated by Justice Rehnquist: that the Reform Act is unconstitutional only so
far as it extends the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to cover common law contract
actions. Id at 92. The Chief Justice's position, however, ignored the plurality and concurring opinions' rationale which rejected the claim-by-claim approach to determining
whether a matter falls within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court or an Article III
court. See Orenstein, Practtce in the Bankrupty Courts After the Decision in Northern P1'pelne
Construction Company- Adjusting to the NewJurisdicton Limits, in SELECTED PROBLEMS AND
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATION IN BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE-1982 186 (1982) (ADVANCED
LEGAL EDUCATION SEMINAR OF HAMLINE UNIVERSITY).

40. 458 U.S. at 87 n.40 (the Court's judgment was immediately effective to bar the
state law contract claim against Marathon).
41. Id at 88 (initial stay of judgment was to October 4, 1982). On October 4, 1982,
the Supreme Court exended the stay to December 24, 1982. 103 S. Ct. 199, 200 (1982).
On December 24, 1982, the Supreme Court lifted the stay and final judgment was entered.
103 S. Ct. 662 (1983). As of this printing, Congress has not acted to reform the bankruptcy courts in accordance with this decision. See in/ta notes 166-81 and accompanying

text.
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ANALYSIS

The Overbroad Grant ofJurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Reform Act

The plurality 42 based its decision to overrule the broad jurisdiction of
non-Article III bankruptcy judges on the doctrine of separation of powers. 43 The Court looked to the intent of the framers of the Constitution
for evidence of the purpose of the protections provided to federal judges
by Article III. 44 The Court concluded that guarantees of life tenure and
an undiminished salary were "incorporated into the Constitution to ensure the independence of the Judiciary from the control of the Executive
5
and Legislative Branches of government."4
The Court also looked to its own decisions affirming the importance of
the principles of separation of powers and an independent judiciary
under the requirements of Article III. The Court noted instances in
which it had previously upheld the protections of life tenure and irreducible compensation.46 As recently as 1980, in United States v. W1',1 4 7 the
Supreme Court held that Congress is forbidden by the Compensation
Clause48 to repeal judicial salary increases after they have taken effect.
In Will, the Court affirmed that "[a] Judiciary free from control by the
Executive and Legislature is essential if there is a right to have claims
decided by judges who are free from potential domination by other
42. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion in which Justices Marshall, Blackman, and
Stevens joined. 458 U.S. at 52. Justice Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion, in which
Justice O'Connorjoined. Id at 89. ChiefJustice Burger filed a dissent. 458 U.S. at 92; see
supra note 39. Justice White filed a dissent, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Powell joined. Id; see infa notes 154-65 and accompanying text.
43. 458 U.S. at 57-60.
44. Id at 57 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 300 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed.
1888)). " 'The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elected,
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.' "Id.,. see 458 U.S. at 58 (citing
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 489 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (Hamilton on the
importance of an independent judiciary)); see also Krattenmaker, supra note 27, at 303.
[The] first section of Article III was intended to impose a specific limitation on
the power of Congress and the Executive to create a federal judicial system. The
framers intended that if Congress and the President wished to establish a federal
judicial office, they first would have to guarantee members of that office independence from the other two branches.
Id
45. 458 U.S. at 59; see also O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 531 (1931)
(Article III protections foreshadowed in Declaration of Independence); THE FEDERALIST
No. 79, at 491 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888) ("a power over a man's subsistence amounts to
a power over his will. ") (emphasis in original).

46. Id.
47. 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ("The Judges . . . shall, at stated Times, receive for
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance
in Office.")
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branches of government."49 In Toth v. Quarles, 50 the Supreme Court held
that "the 'good Behaviour' Clause5 ' guarantees that Art. III judges shall
52
enjoy life tenure, subject only to removal by impeachment."
Based on its affirmation of the requirements of Article III, the Court
concluded that there is no doubt that bankruptcy judges created by the
Reform Act are not Article III judges. 53 The Court then determined
that the bankruptcy courts do not fall into an established exception to
the requirements of Article III, nor should any new exception be created
for them, and therefore the grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts
as established under the Reform Act is unconstitutional.54 The exceptions to Article III considered by the Court were, first, the exception for
legislative courts, and second, the exception for adjuncts to Article III
courts. 55 The Court rejected arguments that the bankruptcy courts fit

within either of these exceptions.
I.

The Bankruptcy Reform Act Courts are not Legislative Courts

Article I of the Constitution provides that "Congress shall have Power
• . . [t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court." 56 Article I
57
also authorizes Congress to enact laws on the subject of bankruptcies
and to adopt any related legislation that is "necessary and proper" to
achieve its objectives.58 Nevertheless, the legislative history of the Reform Act indicates that Congress chose not to create bankruptcy courts
as Article I courts, 59 but rather as adjuncts 6o to the federal district
49. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. at 217-18.
50. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
51. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ("The Judges . . . shall hold their Offices during good
Behavior ....
").
52. 458 U.S. at 59 (citing Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 at 16.)
53. 458 U.S. at 60. "The bankruptcy judges do not serve for life subject to their
continued 'good Behaviour.' . . . Second, the salaries of the bankruptcy judges are not
immune from diminution by Congress." Id at 60-61.
54. Id at 87.
55. Id at 63.
56. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 9.
57. Id, cl. 4. (authorizes Congress "To establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.")

58. Id, cl. 18. (authorizes Congress "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers ....
")
59. See supra note 27; contrary to its procedure in creating the United States Court of
Military Appeals, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1982), the United States Tax Court, 26 U.S.C. § 7441
(1982), and the two local District of Columbia Courts, D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-101(2)
(1981), Congress did not specify that the bankruptcy courts were "established under Article I of the Constitution." See also 458 U.S. at 63 n. 13.
The Act designates the bankruptcy court in each district as an "adjunct" to the
district court. 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Neither House of Congress concluded that the bankruptcy courts should be established as independent
legislative courts.

Id
60.

See supra note 14.
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courts. 6 1 Although Congress did not intend to establish the bankruptcy

courts as legislative courts, the Supreme Court could have found the
bankruptcy courts to be constitutionally valid if they had fit into an exception for Article I courts. 6 2 The Supreme Court determined that the
bankruptcy courts as constituted under the Reform Act, are not permissi63
ble legislative courts.
In only three narrow situations may Congress create legislative courts
which are not subject to the requirements of Article III.64 In each of
those situations the "grant of power to the Legislative and Executive
Branches was historically and constitutionally so exceptional that the
congressional assertion of a power to create legislative courts was consistent with, rather than threatening to, the constitutional mandate of sepa66
ration of powers."65 Those three situations are territorial courts,
68
The bankruptcy
courts-martial,67 and cases involving public rights.
situations.69
narrow
those
of
none
courts fit under
a. The Bankruptcy Courts are not TerritorialCourts
The concept of legislative courts derives from the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 70 in
which the Court held that the exercise of judicial power in the territories
pursuant to Article IV71 does not constitute the exercise of "judicial
power of the United States" as defined by Article 111.72 The Court fol61. 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1982).
62. The government, as an appellant in this case, argued that Congress is empowered
to establish legislative courts to adjudicate bankruptcy-related controversies, and that the

bankruptcy courts as established under the Reform Act should be upheld as a valid exercise of that power. See supra Brief for the United States at 14-33, Northern Pipeline Con-

str. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
63. 458 U.S. at 73-76.
64. Id.at 64. Cf Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962) (limited nature of
"legislative court" doctrine).
65. 458 U.S. at 64.
66. Id
67. Id at 66.
68. Id at 67.
69. Id at 70.
70. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511 (1828).
2. ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
71. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or cther Property belonging to the United States .... ").

72. Territorial courts were:
created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the govern-

ment, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules

and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The
jurisdiction with which they are invested . . . is conferred by Congress, in the
execution of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories
of the United States. Although admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the
states, in those Courts only which are established in pursuance of the third article of the Constitution; the same limitation does not extend to the territories. In
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lowed the same reasoning when it reviewed Congress' creation of non73
Article III courts in the District of Columbia.
The Court characterized the exception to Article III for territorial
courts and courts within the District of Columbia as being limited to
"certain geographical areas, in which no State operated as sovereign
...
. ,, 7 4 Congress may exercise the general powers of government in
these "geographical areas" because to do so creates no conflict with the
principle of state sovereignty. Thus, the principle of federalism is not
violated by an exception to Article III for territorial courts. Further, the
Court seemed to rely on the concept of "exceptional powers bestowed on
Congress by the Constitution" 75 as well as on a historical exception76 to
the requirement for Article III courts in the territories and the District of
Columbia.
The reasons for allowing territorial courts to be constituted as legislative courts are not present in the case of bankruptcy courts. Because
bankruptcy courts exercise jurisdiction over state court matters, such as
the contract claim in the Marathon case, the threat to state sovereignty
and a violation of the principle of federalism are present. Moreover, the
Constitution has granted no exceptional powers to Congress and there
has been no historical exception to the Article III requirements for bankruptcy courts, as for territorial courts.
b.

The Bankruptcy Courts are not Courts-Martial

Like territorial courts, courts-martial involve a "constitutional grant of
power that has been historically understood as giving the political
branches of Government extraordinary control over the precise subject
matter at issue." 77 In Dynes v. Hoover, 78 the Supreme Court stated:
Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offences in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations; and that the power to do so is given without any
connection between it and the 3d article of the Constitution defining
legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers of the general, and
of a state government,
26 US. (1 Pet.) 511, 546.
73. 458 U.S. at 65. See Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838), which
notes that in the District of Columbia there is:
no division of powers between the general and state governments. Congress has
the entire control over the district for every purpose of government; and it is
reasonable to suppose, that in organizing a judicial department here, all judicial
power necessary for the purposes of government would be vested in the courts of
justice.
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 618-19; see also Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1979).
74. 458 U.S. at 64.
75. Id at 70.
76. Id.
77. Id at 66.
78. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858).
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the judicial power of the United States; indeed, that the two powers are
79
entirely independent of each other.
Despite this extraordinary grant of power to Congress for military courts,
the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional attempts of military courts
to bring within their jurisdiction matters properly within the realm of
"judicial power" under Article 111.80
For the same reasons that bankruptcy courts do not fit the exception to
Article III for territorial courts, they do not fit the exception for courtsmartial. The jurisdiction granted to bankruptcy courts is far broader
than that granted to military courts. Moreover, the broad grant ofjurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts creates a threat to state sovereignty and
the principles of federalism; considerations not present for military
courts.
c.

The Bankruptcy Courts are not within the Pubhc Rights Doctrine

The public rights doctrine first appeared in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co., 81 in 1855, where the Court stated:
matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form
that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are
susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may
not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it
82
may deem proper.
The doctrine was developed in Ex parte Bakelite Corp.,8 3 and Williams v.
United States,8 4 to mean a historically recognized distinction between
matters that could be conclusively determined by the executive and legislative branches and matters that are "inherently . . .judicial." 8 5 None
of the cases prior to Marathon, however, clearly articulated the public
rights doctrine as the basis for establishing legislative courts or administrative agencies rather than Article III courts.
The public rights doctrine is based on the principle of sovereign immunity, which recognizes that the government may attach conditions to its
consent to be sued,8 6 and on the principle of separation of powers, which
reserves certain prerogatives to the political, i.e., legislative and execu79. Id at 79.
80. 458 U.S. at 66 n.17;see Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955). Toth holds that
expansion of court-martial jurisdiction over former servicemen after separation from the
armed services encroaches on jurisdiction of Article III courts, where persons on trial are
surrounded with more constitutional safeguards than in military tribunals. See also Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
81. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
82. Id at 284.
83. 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
84. 289 U.S. 553 (1933).
85. 458 U.S. at 67 (citing Exparte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458 (1929)).
86. Id at 67.
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tive, branches of government. 8 7 The effect of the public rights doctrine,
the Court concluded, is that only controversies which involve public
rights may be removed from Article III courts and delegated to legislative courts or administrative agencies for determination.8 8 Private rights,
the Court stated, "lie at the core of the historically recognized judicial
power." 8 9
Although the Court set out the purpose and effects of the public rights
doctrine, the Court stated that the distinction between public and private rights has not been definitively explained in the precedents and that
it was unnecessary to do so in the Marathon case. 9° The Court indicated
only that a matter of public rights must, at a minimum, arise "between
the government and others." 9 1 In contrast, private rights are "the liabil92
ity of one individual to another."
The Court's general discussion of the public rights doctrine provides
little guidance to Congress in its attempt to restructure the Reform Act
according to constitutional standards. Not only did the Marathon Court
refuse to definitively distinguish between private and public rights, it also
failed to discuss whether some matters before the bankruptcy courts are
to be considered matters of public right and others matters of private
right.
The Court's discussion of the public rights doctrine raises several questions which Congress must consider in determining whether establish93
ment of any non-Article III bankruptcy court is constitutionally sound.
First, is the government a party to a bankruptcy proceeding or is the
bankruptcy proceeding an adjudication of the liability of one individual
to another? Second, is there a distinction between the rights to recover
property of the estate 94 or to set aside preferences95 and the right to re87. Id.
88. Id at 70 (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,450, n.7 (1977); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932); and
Katz, Fderal Legislative Courts, 43 HARV. L. REV. 894, 917-18 (1930)).
89. 458 U.S. at 70.

90. Id at 69.
91. 458 U.S. at 69 (quotingExparteBakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 438, 451). But see 458
U.S. at 69 n.23.
[T]he presence of the United States as a proper party to the proceeding is a
necessary but not sufficient means of distinguishing "private rights" from "public rights." And it is also clear that even with respect to matters that arguably
'

fall within the scope of the "public rights doctrine, the presumption is in favor

of Art. III courts.
Id; see also 458 U.S. at 70 n.24 (public rights doctrine does not extend to any criminal
matters, although the government is a proper party).
92. 458 U.S. at 71-72 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 at 51 (1932)).
93. Orenstein, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. V. Marathon Ape Line Co., in BANKRUPTCY II A-6-8 (Nov. 1982) (CLE Seminar, Iowa Chapter, Fed. B. Ass'n).
94. 11 U.S.C. app. Bankr. R. 604, 609 (1982) (prescribe procedure for recovery of
estate property by trustee).
95. Under certain circumstances the government can recover property transferred by
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cover money damages for the estate, 96 as in Marathon? The Court states
that restructuring debtor-creditor relations under the Reform Act "may
well be a 'public right,' "97 but that the right to recover contract damages, as in the Marathon case, "obviously is not."98 Is this distinction one
which can properly be characterized as public rights versus private
rights? The Court provided little guidance to Congress in answering
these questions.
d

No Exception to Article IIIfor a "Specialized" Legislative Court to
Adjudicate Bankruptcy-Related Controversies

The Court rejected appellants' contention that Congress' authority to
establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies" 99 carries with it
an inherent power to establish legislative courts to adjudicate bankruptcy-related controversies.1 00
Appellants, citing Palmorev. United States, 101 argued that pursuant to its
Article I powers, Congress may create non-Article III courts in specialized areas having particularized needs that warrant distinctive treatment.' 0 2 The Court rejected appellants' broad interpretation of Palmore
on several grounds, the most compelling reason being that "appellants'
analysis fails to provide any real protection against the erosion of Art. III
jurisdiction by the unilateral action of the political Branches."' 10 3 The
Court also noted that although independent courts are not required for
all federal adjudications, where Article III does apply, all legislative powers are subject to it.104 The Court's reference in Palmore to "specialized
areas having particularized needs" 105 referred only to geographical areas
such as the District of Columbia and the territories.' 0 6 It did not refer to
the debtor during a short period prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.
§ 547 (1982).
96. 11 U.S.C. app. Bankr. R. Part VII (1982).
97. 458 U.S. at 71.
98. Id.
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
100. 458 U.S. at 72.
101. 411 U.S. 389 (1973), which stated:
[Bloth Congress and this Court have recognized that .

. .

the requirements of

Art. III, which are applicable where laws of national applicability and affairs of
national concern are at stake, must in proper circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment."
Id at 407-08.
102. 458 U.S. at 72-73.
103. 458 U.S. at 74. The "flaw in appellants' analysis is that it provides no limiting
principle. It thus threatens to supplant completely our system of adjudication in independent Art. III tribunals and replace it with a system of 'specialized' legislative
courts." Id at 73.
104. Id at 73.
105.

411 U.S. at 408.

106. 458 U.S. at 76. By this interpretation the Marathon Court reduces Palmore to a
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specialized subject matter areas such as the administration of the laws of
bankruptcy, where "laws of national applicability and affairs of national
concern are at stake."10 7 In areas of national concern and applicability,
the Court held that "the Art. III command of an independent Judiciary
must be honored."108
In summary, the Court stated that "Art. III bars Congress from establishing legislative courts to exercise jurisdiction over all matters related to
those arising under the bankuptcy laws."109 Such legislative courts do
not fall within any of the historically recognized exceptions to the Article
III requirements, and there is not persuasive reason "in logic, history, or
the Constitution" why the bankruptcy courts, as established under the
Reform Act, "lie beyond the reach of Article III."110
2.

The Bankruptcy Courts are not Proper Adjuncts to the District Courts

Congress attempted to establish the bankruptcy courts as adjuncts11
to the United States district courts under section 1471,112 the jurisdictional provision of the Reform Act. Appellants argued that delegation of
certain adjudicative functions to the bankruptcy court, as provided by
the Reform Act, is consistent with the principle and requirements of Article 111.113 The Marathon Court stated that the test for constitutional
territorial case, over the vehement objection of Justice White, author of the Palmore opinion. See 458 U.S. at 114 (White, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 161-72 and accompanying text (discussion Justice White's dissent).
107. 458 U.S. at 76 (quoting Pamore, 411 U.S. at 408).
108. Id

109. Id
110. Id.
111. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 16-18 reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE

CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5802-04; Klee, supra note 27.
112. Reform Act § 241(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982) states:

Jurisdiction.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction
on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have
original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title
11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 is
commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the
district courts.
(d) Subsection (b) or (c) of this section does not prevent a district court or a
bankruptcy court, in the interest of justice, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under
title 11. Such abstention, or a decision not to abstain, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
(e) The bankruptcy court in which a case under title 11 is commenced shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor,
as of the commencement of such case.
Id
113. 458 U.S. at 76-77; Brief for United States at 11-13, 37-45, Northern Pipeline
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delegation of authority to a non-Article III adjunct is whether "the essential attributes of the judicial power" are retained in an Article III
4

court."1

The Court found that the Reform Act "impermissibly removed

most, if not all, of 'the essential attributes of the judicial power' from the
Art. III district court, and . . .vested those attributes in a non-Art. III

adjunct."1 5 Consequently, the Court held that Congress' grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts could not be "sustained as an exercise of
Congress' power to create adjuncts to Art. III courts."1 16
The Court relied on two cases, United States v. Raddatz, 117 and Crowdlv.
Benson, 118 to conclude that the Reform Act does not meet standards governing the permissible assignment of adjudicative functions to a non-Article III court or agency. The Court extracted from these two cases two
principles for determining the extent Congress may vest judicial functions in non-Article III officers. The principles are:
First . . .when Congress creates a substantive federal right, it possesses
substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which that right may
be adjudicated - including the assignment to an adjunct of some functions historically performed by judges. .

.

. Second, the functions of

the adjunct must be limited in such a way that "the essential attributes" of judicial power are retained in the Art. III court. 1 19
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 51 (1982) (bankruptcy court is primarily
a factfinder, analogous to a special master).
114. 458 U.S. at 77 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
115. 458 U.S. at 87;seealso S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17, reprintedt1t
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5801-03 (Congress sought to create "functionally independent bankruptcy court").
Several characteristics of the bankruptcy courts were inconsistent with the adjunct
concept and consistent with the concept of an independent court system, as originally
developed by the House Judicial Committee. SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESs., REPORT ON HEARINGS ON THE COURT ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

FOR BANKRUPTCY

CASES 33 (1978). Characteristics consistent with an independent court system include the

following:
1) The bankruptcy court is a court of the United States under Reform Act § 213, 28
U.S.C. § 451 (1982) and a court of record under § 201(a), 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).

2) Unlike masters, magistrates, and other assistants, bankruptcy judges are judges of
the United States and may be members of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, see § 108, 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982), and of the judicial conferences of the
circuits, Reform Act § 210, 28 U.S.C. § 333 (1982).
3) Bankruptcy judges exercise all of the ordinary powers of the district court judges,
including the power to preside over jury trials, § 241(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1480 (1982),
issue declaratory judgments, § 249, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982), issue writs of Habeas

116.
117.
118.
119.

Corpus, § 250(a), 28 U.S.C. § 2256 (1982) issue contempt citations in certain situations, § 241(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982), and issue all process, orders and judgments necessary to enforce the provisions of the Reform Act. § 10 1(a), II U.S.C.
§ 10(a) (1982).
Marathon, 458 U.S. at 87.
447 U.S. 667 (1980).
285 U.S. 22 (1932).
Marathon, 458 U.S. at 80-81.
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The application of these principles remains obscure. The Court's discussion of Raddatz, 120 the more recent case, 12 1 illuminates the requirements that an adjunct must meet to be constitutionally viable. The
Court's discussion of Crowell,122 however, confuses rather than clarifies
the issue.
In Raddatz, the Supreme Court, upholding the 1978 Federal Magistrates Act, 123 established two standards for the assignment of judicial
functions to a non-Article III officer or adjunct. First, the final decisionmaking authority must remain in an Article III court 124 and second, the
adjunct must be under the complete supervision and control of the Article III court.

25

Neither of the Raddatz standards are met by the bankruptcy courts
established by the Reform Act. The requirement that final decisionmaking authority remain in the Article III court is inadequately met by
a provision for Article III appellate review.12 6 Moreover, under the Reform Act district court judges lack sufficient control over the bankruptcy
judges. For instance, the Reform Act vests all jurisdiction for bank120. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
121. Notably, Raddatz was decided after the Reform Act became law and might have
influenced Congress in establishing the adjudicative structure of the bankruptcy court if it
had been decided before the Reform Act was enacted. See Brief for Appellees at 32 n.10,
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
122. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
123. Raddatz specifically approved the provision of the Federal Magistrates Act, 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) (l) (B) (1976), which the Raddatz Court stated, "permits a district court to
refer to a magistrate a motion to suppress evidence and authorizes the district court to
determine and decide such motion based on the record developed before a magistrate,
including the magistrate's proposed findings of fact and recommendations." 447 U.S. at
669.
124. 447 U.S. at 683.
Although the statute permits the district court to give to the magistrate's proposed findings of fact and recommendation "such weight as [their] merit commands and sound discretion of the judge warrants," . . . that delegation does
not violate Art. III so long as the ultimate decision is made by the district court.
Id. (citation omitted).
125. Eg., id at 686. "[W]e confront a procedure under which Congress has vested in
Art. III judges the discretionary power to delegate certain functions to competent and
impartial assistants, while ensuring that the judges retain complete supervisory control
over the assistants' activities." Id
126. Under the Reform Act, appeals were to be taken from the bankruptcy judge to a
panel of three bankruptcy judges appointed by the chief judge of the respective circuit.
Reform Act §§ 201(a), 241(a), 28 U.S.C. §§ 160, 1482 (1982). If no such appeals panel
were designated, the district court was to exercise appellate jurisdiction. Reform Act
§ 238(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982). If the appeal were decided by a panel, a second appeal
from the panel to the circuit court of appeals would have been necessary to obtain Article
III review. Reform Act § 236(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1293(a) (1982); see Note, supra note 27, at
592. "[B]ecause the threats to the separation of powers and judicial integrity envisioned
by the Framers of article III flow largely from control of judges' subsistence and tenure,
rather than from direct manipulation of the law, appellate review is an inadequate corrective." Id
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ruptcy-related matters in the bankruptcy judges. 127 In addition, the
bankruptcy judges are to be appointed by the president with the advice
and consent of the Senate.128 Finally, the Reform Act contains no provi29
sions for reference or withdrawal of cases.1
In Crowell v. Benson, 130 the Court upheld the use of administrative
agencies as adjuncts. 13 1 The Crowell Court set forth the principle that
when Congress creates rights it may determine the manner in which
those rights will be adjudicated.13 2 Although the Crowell Court held that
Congress has discretion to establish adjuncts to adjudicate congressionally created rights, it rejected the assumption that Congress could assign
adjudication of constitutional rights to an adjunct.133 Although Crowell
allowed Congress broad power to determine the manner in which congressionally created rights will be adjudicated, the act reviewed by the
Crowell Court gave the adjunct only limited power 3 4 in a limited cate127. Reform Act § 241(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (1982). "The bankruptcy court for the
district in which a case under title 11 is commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction
conferred by this section on the district courts." Id
128. Cf Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 685 ("Magistrates are appointed by district judges,
§ 631(a), and subject to removal by them, § 631(h)."). Under the 1898 Act referees were
appointed and removable by the district court. 11 U.S.C. § 62 (1976) (repealed); see supra
note 13 and accompanying text.
129. Cf Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 685 (Blackman J., concurring).
[T]he handling of suppression motions invariably remains completely in the control of the federal district court. The judge may initially decline to refer any
matter to a magistrate. When a matter is referred, the judge may freely reject
the magistrate's recommendation. He may rehear the evidence in whole or in
part. He may call for additional findings or otherwise "recommit the matter to
the magistrate with instructions." See 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1).
Id The 1898 Act provided for automatic reference of bankruptcy cases to a referee, 11
U.S.C. § 45 (repealed 1976); 11 U.S.C. app. Bank R. 102(a) (repealed 1976), and for withdrawal of cases by the district court judge, at any time, for the convenience of the parties
or for other cause. After withdrawal, the district court judge could hear the case himself
or assign it to another referee in the district. 11 U.S.C. app. Bankr. R. 102(b) (repealed
1976).
130. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
131. Id In Crowell, the Court upheld the power of "the United States Employees'
Compensation Commission, to make initial factual determinations pursuant to a federal
statute requiring employers to compensate their employees for work-related injuries occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States." Marathon, 458 U.S. at 77.
132. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 54; see Marathon, 458 U.S. at 83.
[W]hen Congress creates a statutory right, it clearly has the discretion, in defining that right, to create presumptions, or assign burdens of proof, or prescribe
remedies; it may also provide that persons seeking to vindicate that right must do
so before particularized tribunals created to perform the specialized adjudicative
tasks related to that right.
Id
133. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 60-61; stee Marathon, 458 U.S. at 82.
134. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 54. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1927), allowed the deputy commissioner to determine
questions of fact as to the circumstances, nature, extent, and consequences of the injuries
sustained by the employee for which compensation is to be made in accordance with the
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35
gory of cases.'
The essential principle that the Marathon Court derived from Crowell is
that adjudication of constitutionally based rights must be reserved to Ar37
must
ticle III courts,1 36 and the "essential attributes" of judicial power
rights.
created
be retained by Article III courts even for congressionally
The Marathon Court found that the distinction between congressionally
created rights and other rights implicitly underlies the decisions in both
Crowell and Raddatz and that such a distinction is required by the princi38
ple of separation of powers.'
Although Congress' right to determine how a statutory right will be
adjudicated is incidental to its power to define the right that it has created,' 39 no comparable justification exists when the right is not of congressional creation.1 40 Assignment of the adjudication of a constitutional

right to an adjunct would create "substantial inroads into functions that
have traditionally been performed by the Judiciary . . . . [S]uch inroads suggest unwarranted encroachments upon the judicial power of the
4
United States, which our Constitution reserves for Art. III courts."''
The Marathon Court held that the Reform Act "carries the possibility
of such an unwarranted encroachment"142 because many of the rights
subject to adjudication by the "adjunct" bankruptcy court are not congressionally created.14 3 As a result, the Court concluded that Congress'
prescribed standards. The agency had no power to enforce its orders and every compensation order was subject to review in the district court. See also Marathon, 458 U.S. at 78, 85
(comparing the Longshoremen's Act with the Reform Act); infra note 143.
135. 285 U.S. at 38 (act deals exclusively with compensation for disability or death
from injury on navigable waters of the United States and applies only when relation of
master and servant exists).
136. 458 U.S. at 81-82.
137. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
138. 458 U.S. at 83.
139. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
140. 458 U.S. at 83-84.
141. Id at 84.
142. Id
143. Id. at 84. "Indeed, the cases before us, which center upon appellant Northern's
claim for damages for breach of contract and misrepresentation, involves a right created
" Id. (emphasis original).
by state law ..
The Court also contrasted the administrative scheme reviewed in Crowell with the
Reform Act, which vests all "essential attributes" of the judicial power of the United
States in the "adjunct" bankruptcy court:
First, the agency in Crowell made only specialized, narrowly confined factual
determinations regarding a particularized area of law. In contrast, the subjectmatter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts encompasses not only traditional
matters of bankruptcy, but also "all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or
arising in orrelatedto cases arising under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1976 ed.,
Supp. IV) (emphasis added). Second, while the agency in Crowell engaged in
statutorily channeled factfinding functions, the bankruptcy courts exercise "all
of the jurisdiction" conferred by the Act on the district courts, § 1471 (c) (emphasis added). Third, the agency in Crowell possessed only a limited power to issue
compensation orders pursuant to specialized procedures, and its orders could be
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attempt to constitute the bankruptcy courts as adjuncts to the district
4
courts under the Reform Act could not be sustained.14
The Court's analysis of Crowell and its application to the Reform Act
raises numerous questions.' 45 The Court implies that the bankruptcy
courts could be constitutionally established as adjuncts if they adjudicated only congressionally created rights. For Congress to reconstitute
the bankruptcy courts along these lines, it must first determine how congressionally created rights are distinguished from constitutional rights.
Since many federal laws are based on constitutional rights,146 could suits
involving these rights be tried before an adjunct, or must they be heard
by an Article III judge?
Second, even if rights can be clearly categorized as either constitutional or congressionally created, where the latter are enforced between
private parties, the attributes of judicial power must be retained by an
Article III court. 147 Although rights created under the bankruptcy laws
are congressionally based, some of the matters adjudicated under the
bankruptcy laws involve disputes between private parties. Thus, nonArticle III bankruptcy judges must be subject to the control and supervienforced only by order of the district court. By contrast, the bankruptcy courts
exercise all ordinary powers of district courts, including the power to preside
overjury trials, 28 U.S.C. § 1480 (1976 ed., Supp. IV), the power to issue declaratory judgments, § 2201, the power to issue writs of habeas corpus, § 2256, and
the power to issue any order, process, or judgment appropriate for the enforcement of the provisions of Title 11, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1976 ed. Supp. IV).
Fourth, while orders issued by the agency in Crowell were to be set aside if "not
supported by the evidence," the judgments of the bankruptcy courts are apparently subject to review only under the more deferential "clearly erroneous" standard. . . . Finally, the agency in Crowell was required by law to seek
enforcement of its compensation orders in the district court. In contrast, the
bankruptcy courts issue final judgments, which are binding and enforceable even
in the absence of an appeal.
Id at 85-86 (footnotes omitted).

144. 458 U.S. at 86-87.
145. Orenstein, supra note 93.
146. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (providing a right of civil action for the deprivation
of civil rights under color of state action).
147. In relying on Crowell, a case involving adjudication of private rights, the Marathon
Court appears to have resurrected a case that was effectively overruled by Atlas Roofing Co.
v. OccupationalSafety & Health Review Comm"n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). The Atlas Roofing Court
stated:
Our prior cases support administrative factfinding in only those situations involving "public rights," e.g., where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under an otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public rights.
Wholly private tort, contract, and property cases, as well as a vast range of other
cases, are not at all implicated.
430 U.S. at 458 (emphasis added); see also 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3:11, p.
188 (2d ed. 1978). Thus, based on the Marathon Court's discussion of the public rights
doctrine and the Court's holding in Atlas Roofing, even a constitutionally established adjunct may only determine matters of public right, Crowel notwithstanding. Interview
with James P. McCarthy, Attorney for Marathon, in Minneapolis (Mar. 8, 1983).
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sion of the Article III court and the ultimate decision-making authority
must be retained by an Article III court.
Third, the Marathon Court seemed to move from the Crowel distinction
between congressionally created rights and constitutional rights148 to its
own distinction between congressionally created rights and state created
rights. 149 Although the distinctions are analogous, the Court failed to
analyze the differences between them and the effect those differences will
have on an attempt by Congress to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts as
constitutionally sound adjuncts. Congress possesses some flexibility in regard to constitutionally created rights, but it has no flexibility or power
in regard to state created rights. The principle of separation of powers
lies behind the distinction between congressionally created rights and
constitutional rights1So The principles of federalism and state sovereignty lie behind the distinction between congressionally created rights
and state created rights. How will these differences in underlying principles affect the manner in which Congress may establish viable adjunct
bankruptcy courts?
Finally, the Court suggested no limits to the authority of adjuncts to
adjudicate congressionally created bankruptcy laws. Significantly, the
Court declined to endorse the constitutionality of the bankruptcy courts
as they existed under the 1973 Bankruptcy Rules. 15 ' Under the 1973
rules, which were in operation until the Reform Act took effect, bankruptcy referees exercised broad powers but remained subject to some
controls by the district court.' 52 Since the Court declined to state
148. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
149. 458 U.S. at 84.
150. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
151. 458 U.S. at 79 n.31. In regard to the powers exercised by the bankruptcy referees
immediately before the Reform Act took effect the plurality stated: "[T]hose particular
adjunct functions, which represent the culmination of years of gradual expansion of the
power and authority of the bankruptcy referee, see I Collier [on Bankruptcy 1.02 (15th
ed. 1981)] have never been explicitly endorsed by this Court." Id.
152. We note, moreover, that the 1978 Act made at least three significant changes
from the bankruptcy practice that immediately preceded it. First, of course, the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts was "substantially expanded" by the Act.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 13 (1977). Before the Act the referee had no jurisdiction, except with consent, over controversies beyond those involving property in
the actual or constructive possession of the court. 11 U.S.C. § 46(b) (repealed).
See MacDonald v. Pymouth Trust Co., 286 U.S. 263, 266, (1932). It cannot be
doubted that the new bankruptcy judges, unlike the referees, have jurisdiction
far beyond that which can be even arguably characterized as merely incidental
to the discharge in bankruptcy or a plan for reorganization. Second, the bankruptcy judges have broader powers than those exercised by the referees. See
infr, at 84-85; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, supra, p. 12, and nn.63-68. Finally, and
perhaps most significantly, the relationship between the district court and the
bankruptcy court was changed under the 1978 Act. Before the Act, bankruptcy
referees were "subordinate adjuncts of the district courts." Id., at 7. In contrast,
the new bankruptcy courts are "independent of the United States district
1.03, p. 1-9. Before the Act, bankcourts." Ibid.; Collier [on Bankruptcy,]
ruptcy referees were appointed and removable only by the district court. 11
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whether the bankruptcy court under the 1973 rules would have passed
constitutional muster, attempts to create an adjunct bankruptcy court
could result in numerous trips to the Supreme Court before the limits are
clearly defined and a new bankruptcy system can be conclusively
established.
3.

Summary

The Marathon plurality unequivocally held that the bankruptcy courts,
as constituted under the Reform Act, are in violation of Article III and
are therefore unconstitutional. In distinguishing the impermissible bankruptcy courts from constitutionally permissible legislative courts and adjuncts, however, the Supreme Court offered little guidance to Congress in
reconstructing the bankruptcy courts as constitutionally viable non-Article III adjuncts.S 3 The Court's discussion of public rights and of congressionally created rights raises more questions than it answers. A more
thorough analysis particularly as applied to the specific work of the
bankruptcy courts will be necessary to determine what limits must be
placed on non-Article III bankruptcy courts for them to be constitutionally viable. Indeed, the Court's failure to define the limits of a non-Article III bankruptcy court appears to leave Congress with little alternative
to reconstituting the bankruptcy courts as Article III courts.
B. Justice White's Dzssent: A Balancing Test
Justice White, dissenting in an opinion154 that relied heavily on his
Palmore v. United States155 analysis, asserted that Congress can create
courts outside of the structure of Article III whenever it determines that
there is a particularized need in a special area that warrants distinctive
U.S.C. § 62 (repealed). And the district court retained control over the reference by his power to withdraw the case from the referee. Bkrtcy. Rule 102.

Thus even at the trial stage, the parties had access to an independent judicial
officer. Although Congress could still lower the salary of referees, they were not
dependent on the political branches of government for their appointment. To
paraphrase JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S observation in Raddatz, supra, the primary

"danger of a 'threat' to the 'independence' of the [adjunct came] from within,
rather than without, the judicial department." 447 U.S., at 685 (concurring
opinion).
458 U.S. at 79 n.31.
153. Undoubtedly, the Court was reticent in providing guidelines for Congress because
it was unwilling to take on the legislative task of reforming the bankruptcy laws. Perhaps
this is why the Court struck down all jurisdiction under § 1471, although it could have
decided the Marathon case by holding only § 1471 (b) unconstitutional. In Alabama Furniture Co. v. Still (In re Rivers), No. 81-0682 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 198 1),cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
764 (1983), the Court turned down an opportunity to clarify its decision in Marathon.
Interview with James P. McCarthy, Attorney for Marathon, in Minneapolis (Mar. 8,
1983).
154. 458 U.S. at 92. Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Powell in his dissent.
155. 411 U.S. 389 (1973); see 458 U.S. at 114-15.
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treatment. 156 He proposed, in contrast to the limits prescribed by the
plurality, a balancing test in which the burdens on Article III values are
weighed against the values Congress hopes to serve when it creates an
157
Article I court.
Justice White concluded that the bankruptcy courts, as established
under the Reform Act, satisfied the standards of his balancing test. He
determined that the non-Article III bankruptcy courts were constitutionally sound for the following reasons:
1. The availablity of appellate review by an Article III court helps
ensure proper separation of powers;158
2. Bankruptcy matters are "of little interest to the political
branches"' 159 and thus there is little reason to fear that a legislative
bankruptcy court will represent a dangerous accumulation of power in
one of the political branches of government 160 or violate the principles
of federalism; and
3. There is a compelling need to relieve the stresses on the old bankruptcy system. 161
The plurality rejected Justice White's analysis because it provides no
real limits and offers no protection against the "erosion of Art. III jurisdiction by the unilateral action of the political Branches."' 16 2 Although
Justice White stated that he was not abandoning Article 111,163 that is
156. 458 U.S. at 114-15 (citing Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. at 407-08).
157. Justice White states:
The inquiry should . . .focus equally on those Art. III values and ask whether
and to what extent the legislative scheme accommodates them or, conversely,
substantially undermines them. The burden on Art. III values should then be
measured against the values Congress hopes to serve through the use of Art. I
courts.
458 U.S. at 115.
158. Id at 115.
159. Id
160. Id at 116.
161. Id.
162. Id at 74. The Court states:

dissent suggests that Art. III "should be read as expressing one
value that must be balanced against competing constitutional values and legislative responsibilities," and that the Court retains the final word on how the balance is to be struck. Post, at 113-114. The dissent would find the Art. III "value"
accommodated where appellate review to Art. III courts is provided and where

JUSTICE WHITE'S

the Art. I courts are "designed to deal with issues likely to be of little interest to
the political branches." Post, at 115-116. But the dissent's view that appellate
review is sufficient to satisfy either the command or the purpose of Art. III is
incorrect. See n.39, tnfra. And the suggestion that we should consider whether
the Art. I courts are designed to deal with issues likely to be of interest to the
political Branches would undermine the validity of the adjudications performed
by most of the administrative agencies, on which validity the dissent so heavily
relies.
Id at 74 n.28.
163. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 113. Justice White states that "Article III is not to be read
out of the Constitution; rather, it should be read as expressing one value that must be
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exactly what he proposed.164 Justice White was correct in stating that
the Court has allowed vast power to be vested in Article I courts and
administrative agencies, but he stretched the historical precedents too
far165 and in effect read Article III out of the Constitution.
C

The Stay and the Aftermath

The Supreme Court's decision to apply its ruling in Marathon prospectively and to stay the decision first to October 4, 1982,166 and finally to
December 24, 1982,167 created confusion among the bankruptcy courts
and federal district courts regarding the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
courts until Congress acts to reform the bankruptcy laws. Matters which
had proceeded to final judgment or orders for which the appeal period
had expired as of the date of the Marathon opinion are apparently res
judicata.168 Numerous questions and conflicting opinions have arisen,
however, regarding the effect of the stay and the period until Congress
acts on matters pending before the bankruptcy courts at the time of the
Marathon decision and matters that have subsequently arisen.
Various courts have taken conflicting positions regarding the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts during the period of the stay. A West Virginia bankruptcy court 169 held that the bankruptcy judge could not
exercise the powers of an Article III judge during the period of the
stay.17 0The bankruptcy judge was, however, authorized and expected to
exercise the powers granted under the Reform Act "which are not constitutionally infirm."' 17 1 In addition, the West Virginia court held that the
balanced against competing constitutional values and legislative responsibilities. This
Court retains the final word on how that balance is to be struck." Id.
164. Id Justice White states that:
There is no difference in principle between the work that Congress may assign to
an Art. I court and that which the Constitution assigns to Art. III courts. Unless
we want to overrule a large number of our precedents upholding a variety of Art.
I courts - not to speak of those Art. I courts that go by the contemporary name
of "administrative agencies" - this conclusion is inevitable. It is too late to go
back that far; too late to return to the sinplicity of the principlepronouncedin Art. III and
defended so vigorously and persuasively by Hamilton in The Federalist Nos. 7882.
Id (emphasis added).
165. See 458 U.S. at 112. Justice White quotes National Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337
U.S. 582 (1949) for the assertion that "[Wie cannot impute to Congress an intent now or
in the future to transfer jurisdiction from constitutional to legislative courts for the purpose of emasculating the former." Id at 644. Justice White further states "Justice Harlan
continued the process of intellectual repudiation begun by Chief Justice Vinson in Tdewater." 458 U.S. at 112.

166. 458 U.S. at 87-88.
167.
168.
169.
(Bankr.
170.

103 S. Ct. 199, 200 (1982).
458 U.S. at 88.
Armco, Inc. v. Cherry Pond Coal Co. (In re Cherry Pond Coal Co.), 21 Bankr. 588
S.D.W. Va. 1982).
Id. at 591.

171. Id
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bankruptcy court could exercise powers "similar in nature to powers of
adjuncts"' 72 declared legitimate in Crowell and Raddatz. 173 A New Mexico bankruptcy court 174 took the contrary position that during the stay
period the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, as intended by Congress,
175
continued until the expiration of the stay.
During the time that the stay was in effect, the Supreme Court was
given the opportunity to determine the effect of the Marathon decision if
the stay expired before Congress took action. In United States v. Security
Industrial Bank, 176 the appellee argued that all of the provisions of the

Reform Act are unconstitutional and inoperative and therefore if the

77
stay expired before Congress acted, the 1898 Act would be revived.'
The Supreme Court refused to address this issue, stating that "because
our decision in [Marathon] is prospective only, . . . and because we have
stayed the issuance of our mandate in that case to December 24, 1982,
• . . that decision does not affect the judgment in this case."178
When the Marathon stay expired on December 24, 1982, the district
courts adopted an interim emergency rule, drafted by the Judicial Conference of the United States to permit the continued adjudication of
bankruptcy matters.179 Like the stay, the emergency rule has created
wide-spread confusion and disagreement. At least one court has held the

172. Id
173. The Anmco court stated that a description of the adjunct powers which the bankruptcy judges could exercise were unnecessary to its decision, but suggested a process to
"minimize the impairment of bankruptcy administration while avoiding violence to Article III of the Constitution." 21 Bankr. at 591 & n.3.
174. Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 21 Bankr. 645
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1982).
175. Id at 647; see also Weichenthal v. Rapperswill Corp. (In re Rapco Foam, Inc.), 22
Bankr. 637 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1982) (where in controversies related to cases which are
substantially completed, the court should exercise its jurisdiction to completion, otherwise
court should refrain from exercising jurisdiction); Schneider v. 2-Star Foods, Inc., (In re
Cumberland Enter., Inc.), 22 Bankr. 626 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (Marathon stay allows
bankruptcy court to exercise jurisdiction to full breadth of its authority during stay period); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Vaale (In re Cascade Oil Co.), 22 Bankr. 348 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982) (bankruptcy courts should not exercise jurisdiction where issues are not
those traditionally reserved to the bankruptcy courts; stay not applicable to those cases
where deflection of jurisdiction would not impair the administration of the bankruptcy
courts); Hassett v. Ganz, (In re O.P.M. Leasing Serv., Inc.), 21 Bankr. 986 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982); Minnesota Bankr. Court, General Order in Bankruptcy (D. Minn. filed
July 6, 1982) (suspending all discuvery procedure and trial of adversary proceedings to
recover judgment for money or property under bankruptcy law against litigant who is not
the debtor or the trustee).
176. 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982).
177. Id.at 409-10.
178. Id at 410 n.5 (citations omitted).
179. See, e.g., EMERGENCY RULE (D. Minn. Adopted Dec. 21, 1982). The emergency
rule provides for reference of bankruptcy cases by the district court to the bankruptcy
judges and withdrawal by the district court at any time. EMERGENCY RULE (c). The rule
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rule to be unconstitutional.180 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has declined an opportunity to review the validity of the rule. 181
III.

CONCLUSION

The Marathon plurality's remarkable decision to hold unconstitutional
all jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts under the Reform Act is a powerful affirmation of the requirements of Article III. Assuming that the
essential purpose of Article III, as expressed by the framers of the Constitution and earlier court decisions, is to protect the judiciary from political pressure,' 8 2 the question arises regarding whether that protection is
necessary or even attainable in this day and age.
As Justice White correctly noted in his dissent,' 8 3 vast judicial power
has been vested in administrative agencies which are subject to the political will of Congress and the President. State court judges who are not
subject to the requirements of Article III routinely make decisions that
affect the lives of individuals far more profoundly than the contract
claims presented in the Marathon case. Indeed, the claims presented in
Marathon could have been decided by a state court judge who is periodically required to stand for election and who may be defeated for re-election on the basis of an unpopular decision.18 4 Those same claims could
imposes certain limitations on the powers of bankruptcy judges. The bankruptcy judges
may not conduct:
(A) a proceeding to enjoin a court;
(B) a proceeding to punish a criminal contempt (i) not committed in the bankruptcy judge's actual presence; or
(ii) warranting a punishment of imprisonment;
(C) an appeal from a judgment, order, decree, or decision of a United States bankruptcy judge; or
(D) jury trials.
Id at 2. Matters which may not be performed by a bankruptcy judge are transferred to a
district court judge. EMERGENCY RULE (d)(1). In proceedings involving claims similar to
those in the Marathon case, the bankruptcy judge may not enter judgment or a dispositive
order, but must submit findings, conclusions, and a proposed judgment or order to the
district court judge, unless the parties consent to the entry of judgment or order by the
bankruptcy judge. EMERGENCY RULE (d)(3)(B). The rule provides for district court review of a final order or judgment of a bankruptcy judge. EMERGENCY RULE (e).
180. See Color Craft Press, Ltd. v. Nationwide Shopper Sys. (In re Color Craft Press,
Ltd.), 27 Bankr. 392 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983) (rule is invalid insofar as it relies on juridiction
under §§ 1471(a) and (b) since Marathon Court struck down all of § 1471); Gillman v.
Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 27 Bankr. 407 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983) (based
upon same views as those expressed in Color Craft Press). But see Doctor v. Gleicher (In re
Stillman), 26 Bankr. 834 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983) (failure to carry out rule unanimously
adopted by judges or appellate court would constitute judicial anarchy).
181. In re Keene Corp., 103 S. Ct. 1237 (1983) (denying petition for writ of prohibition
and/or mandamus).
182. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
183. 458 U.S. at 112.
184. See MINN. CONST. art. 6, § 7, which states: "The term of office of all judges shall
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483

not be decided by a bankruptcy judge appointed by the President to a
fourteen-year term.
Thus, if raw political influence is not the evil at which this decision is
aimed, the Court's decision can only be understood as affirming the underlying principles of Article III-federalism and separation of powers.
These principles require that when state court matters are decided in a
federal court, they must be decided in an atmosphere free from the pressures of the political branches of the federal government. The relationship between the federal government and the states is still a vital issue
and the Marathon decision is one attempt to define the parameters of that
relationship.
be sixyears and until their successors are qualified. They shall be elected by the voters
from the area which they are to serve in the manner provided by law."
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